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ON AN AMENDMENT OF THE MORALITY
OF A PHYSICIST’S PROFESSIONAL ACTIONS.
A NEW ELEMENT OF INCULTURATION OF CHRISTIANITY
INTO A SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION
A b s t r a c t. Physicists are bound, by the established methods and standards of Physics, to
think and act within an epistemological framework that is deeply influenced by I. Kant. The
epistemological climate they find themselves in is opposed to the epistemological climate of
Natural Realism and, thus, to the epistemological climate of Christian revelation, when it
speaks about our world. This contrast damages the internal harmony of each physicist’s mental
world to a degree that depends on his overall mindset as well as on his professional work.
This situation is ongoing since the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century, so that the earlier
civilization imbued with a realist and Christian spirit is superseded, by and large, by a scienti-
fic-technological civilization.
The historical development of Physics has brought about the situation that the professional
work of physicists produces, with its doubtless successes and contributions to progress, imme-
diately together with its morally good object two enchained morally bad effects. The first bad
effect is the co-existence, in a physicist’s mind, of two opposite epistemological climates,
which damages the internal harmony of his mental world. That immediately entails a second
bad effect, insofar a physicist who wants to be professionally competitive finds himself obliged
to follow the methods and standards of physics as they happen to be now. In that way, he
contributes to the lack of harmony in his own mental world and his grain of sand to perpetuate
the spirit of those methods and standards. The situation is worse for a physicist who is a Chri-
stian and wants to do his professional work for the glory of God (cf. 1 Cor 10:31). In both
cases, a physicist is denying in practice, by his professional work, what he is convinced of in
theory, namely of Natural Realism and, additionally in the case of a Christian, that Christian
revelation speaks of our world in the spirit of Natural Realism.
All that is not unknown, but nevertheless is practically passed by in the academic dis-
course. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to call attention to this topic and then to
suggest some ways of examining more specifically the contrast of the epistemological climates.
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As Physics is partly shaped by experimental interventions, its historical development is also
partly contingent. This is why it is possible to achieve a better harmony of the epistemological
climates of Physics and Natural Realism. The article suggests some ideas in that respect, too.
If these ideas turn out to be fruitful, they would contribute to the inculturation of Christianity
in our scientific-technological civilization. In other words, it would be a flanking aid for the
New Evangelization.
Key words: inculturation of Christianity; morality of actions with double effect; physics;
scientific-technological civilization; Natural Realism; Christian revelation; epistemological
climates.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article, it has been argued that the morality of a physicist’s
professional activity, while assumed as morally good (disregarding abuses,
structures of sin and the like), suffers from two specific negative effects
immediately and almost inevitably attached to the proper professional
actions.1 These negative effects stem from the strong difference, if not oppo-
sition, between the epistemological climate a physicist has grown up and the
epistemological climate, which his professional work is imbued with. Some
more details will be presented in section II below. As it seems, there is no
publication that deals with this issue. Thence, the view presented is absolu-
tely minoritarian, but it draws on facts that hardly can be contested (sec-
tions III, IV). The goal of the present article is to suggest the beginning of
an amendment already insinuated in that earlier article (sections V, VI).
The difference between the epistemological climates referred to is within
the scope of theologians as well as non-believers. The latter are, or have
been, acquainted with the epistemological climate generated by Natural Rea-
lism. The former are, additionally, acquainted with the epistemological cli-
mate in which Christian revelation speaks about this world and which is fully
in harmony with the epistemological climate generated by Natural Realism.
Now, the epistemological climate of physics is opposed to Natural Realism
and, therefore also opposed to the epistemological climate in which Christian
revelation speaks about this world.
Accordingly, a first step towards the purpose of this article is to foster the
awareness of this opposition, among non-believers as well as among theolo-
gians. As has just been mentioned, everybody has grown up, at least until
1 RUDOLF LARENZ, Physics – ‘Alienation from’ instead of ‘Orientation towards’ the
Creator?, Roczniki Teologii Moralnej [Lublin] 3(58), 2011: 5-37.
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a certain age, in the climate of Natural Realism. The distinctive trait is that
reality itself is understood to be cognitively assimilated by a human person.
This stance is opposed to ideas like language games (Wittgenstein), views of
the world as-if (Vaihinger), and purely invented “cognitive” representations
(Einstein). Theologians know that Christian revelation endorses Natural Rea-
lism, and non-believers know that theologians hold precisely that view. In
other words, there is a common starting point, which is decisive for the dia-
logue between Theology and Physics to be well-founded.
Before turning to a possible amendment of the morality of a physicist’s
professional actions, let us summarize the assessment of its present morality
as given in detail in the article quoted. Above all, it draws on the difference
of “epistemological climates”, one stemming from the world as experienced
and given (natural realism, appreciation of the high cognitive value of expe-
rience) and the other stemming from the view of the world as construed
model (appreciation of the cognitive value of experience as low or none).
II. MORAL ASSESSMENT
The assessment of the morality of a physicist’s professional actions fol-
lows the theory of the morality of actions with double effect. First, the pro-
fessional work of a physicist is supposed to produce something morally good.
Or in classical terminology, the moral object of these actions is good.2 But
in our case, the object is accompanied by two bad effects, namely
(i) damaging impact on the internal harmony of the physicist’s mental world
by hosting two opposite views: the physicist’s actions are (knowingly or not)
inspired by the view that nature is not intelligible, while he has grown up in the
view that nature is intelligible (natural realism, and
(ii) a contribution to perpetuating that situation (i), in paticular, to perpetu-
ating an epistemological climate opposed to natural realism.
Notice that the morally bad effects are “almost necessarily” connected
with the object of the action. Properly speaking, the bad effects are not only
connected with the object, or immediately subsequent to the object. Rather,
the bad effects come about by realizing the very action producing its object.
This yields a sort of contradiction in the physicist’s mind to the degree he
is (implicitly or explicitly) convinced of Natural Realism: he acts as if he had
2 Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 1751-1754.
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the view that nature is not intelligible, despite of knowing (implicitly or expli-
citly) that nature is intelligible.
These bad effects do not turn the total moral value from good into bad,
but they diminish the action’s moral goodness that would derive from the
object alone. In this sense, the two bad effects could be qualified as a moral
circumstance inseparably integrated into the professional action.
It is difficult to reject the comparison of the mentioned contradiction in
a physicist’s mind to a self-mutilation as being ‘too strong’. In most cases,
the situation that a physicist, by his daily professional actions, practically
contradicts what he is theoretically convinced of, will lead to a sort of inse-
parable mixture of two opposite stances, in his mental world. It might hap-
pen, and it often does happen, that he is not really aware of this situation or,
when being aware of it, is not aware of its cause.
This situation is self-protecting in the following sense: if a physicist wants
to be professionally competitive, his professional work should obey the me-
thods and standards of physics. Thence, he contributes nolens volens his grain
of sand to perpetuate the spirit of those methods and standards. This argu-
ment holds, of course, for every profession. But there can be differences from
one profession to the other regarding the degree to which the spirit of the
standards is in harmony with, or opposed to, natural realism.
The fact that this particular lack of harmony within a physicist’s mental
world protects itself adds something to the moral assessment of his professio-
nal actions just mentioned. In my view, the moral goodness of the professio-
nal actions diminishes further, because that lack of harmony of a physicist’s
mental world is headed to increase over time, which in turn might bring
about a deep alienation from Natural Realism. Additionally, that lack of
harmony of a physicist’s mental world is shared by all professionals of phy-
sics so that it can hardly be overcome by a single physicist alone.
Let us now turn to the case of a physicist who is a Christian. The appre-
ciation of experience as having little cognitive value (or none at all), is not
only opposed to Natural Realism, but also to the appreciation Christian reve-
lation gives to the cognitive value of experience when speaking about our
world. As has already been mentioned, Holy Scripture gives to understand
that a natural theology is possible, i.e. that human experience and reason
(= natural realism) are able to attain the insight that this world is what the
Bible calls ‘created’. Therefore, this world has a Creator. The all-important
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circumstance here is that this insight can be achieved unaided by the Bible
or by any other knowledge of Christianity.3
Thus, if a physicist is (implicitly or explicitly) convinced that a natural theo-
logy exists, he finds himself in the situation that his daily professional activity
practically contradicts not only Natural Realism that he is theoretically convinced
of, but also the specific tenet of Christian revelation about the intelligibility of
this world. In other words: He acts as if he had the view by reason and faith
that nature is not intelligible, despite of knowing (implicitly or explicitly) that
nature is intelligible. In rigor, this holds, first, only in relation to the natural
knowledge of the Creator. Nevertheless, if nature discloses its innermost constitu-
tion as created, it will also disclose something, in a subordinated way, about its
other properties such as its own laws (“laws of nature”).
This lack of harmony might have different degrees in different persons
according to two “parameters.” The first parameter covers the range of world-
views: the lowest degree belongs to a physicist who is, more or less, an-
chored in Natural Realism, but is not a believer and as such has not commit-
ted himself to Christian revelation. A higher degree refers to a physicist who
is a Christian and as such has committed himself (implicitly or explicitly) to
the view of Christian revelation about the intelligibility of nature. A next
degree may be found in a physicist who is a Catholic, because he has the
certainty provided by the explicit teaching of the Church’s Magisterium in
that matter. There is a highest degree, which belongs to a physicist who is
a Catholic and deliberately wishes to follow the advice given in 1 Cor 10:31.
The second parameter covers the range of the object of a physicist’s pro-
fessional actions: if the goal of the actions consists in producing some tech-
nological product, practical factors of all sort are relevant so that the aiming
at knowledge for its own sake is secondary. Particularly, it seems reasonable
to make models adapted to the practical goal and perform, to this end, sim-
plifications and abstractions. Epistemological criteria are less relevant and,
therefore, the lack of harmony of a physicist’s mental world is less deep. On
the other hand, a physicist whose professional actions concern fundamental
questions, for instance elementary particles, cosmology and the like, where
technological advance is merely a byproduct, the aiming at knowledge for its
own sake has priority. In such cases, models as well as abstractions and
simplifications have a direct epistemological bearing. Consequently, the lack
of harmony of a physicist's mental world can be deep.
3 Cf. FIRST VATICAN COUNCIL, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, Dz 1785, 1806.
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*
Taking all together, this moral assessment calls for an amendment of Phy-
sics, first from the point of view of Natural Realism and then backed up by
Christian revelation. This has already been insinuated in the mentioned earlier
article and should happen by an “internal reform” of Physics with the goal
of converting the contrast or opposition of epistemological climates into
a harmonious relationship. On the other hand, Catholic Theology is not a can-
didate for internal reforms, because its growth is essentially homogeneous and
thus keeps its identity, while physics has undergone well known essential
changes of paradigms.
The question of how to bring about such an internal reform of Physics, is
quite another thing. It it outside the scope of this article, but it has already
become clear that a proper amendment is not a merely superficial re-arrange-
ment and cannot be achieved neither by a single person nor in a short time.
But it might be helpful to have a closer look at the two epistemological
climates, in order to ascertain better when it comes to suggest the first steps
of an amendment.
III. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLIMATE OF NATURAL REALISM
The German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann was affiliated, in the beginning
of his academic career, to the New-Kantianism of the Marburg School. Later
he left this stance and embraced what he called ‘natural realism’. However,
he did not completely abandon the Kantian view: in his view of the process
of knowing, he continued attributing a certain priority to the person’s con-
sciousness before reality. If we disregard this element, we arrive, by and
large, at a sort of realism similar to that which Aristotle had embraced. In
any case, Hartmann has impressive words to express how strongly reality
shapes the human cognitive capacity. The gentle power of reality makes
obsolete any attempt of overriding by a purely theoretical argument what has
been perceived. The knowing subject cannot escape reality.4
Natural Realism is the only philosophical position that is not preceded by
any other position. Additionally, any other philosophical position is preceded
4 NICOLAI HARTMANN, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Berlin, 1965), Chapter
13 ‘Natürlicher Realismus’, p. 33-134 and p. 134-135.
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by Natural Realism which cannot be completely left. A human person acqui-
res that position from his earliest childhood on by just living in a normal
social and cognitive environment and recognizes that other persons are in the
same situation. Moreover, it contains what Thomas Aquinas and others would
call evident insights or insights per se notae, such as the principle of noncon-
tradiction (nothing can be and not be, at the same time) or the principle that
the whole is more comprehensive than its parts, in the realm of theoretical
knowledge. In the realm of moral knowledge, the principle that good is to be
done and evil to be avoided and that killing the innocent is intrinsically evil.
IV. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CLIMATE OF PHYSICS
While the individual methods, standards and rules of the art in Physics
develop, the spirit by which they are inspired is practically constant. This is
mostly due to the presence of Mathematics in Physics. According to most
historians of science, the mathematization of physics has been the greatest
single factor constituent of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century.5
This has made the modern natural science named ‘physics’, which has little
in common with the philosophy of nature inherited from antiquity. The im-
portance and, at the same time, the problematic character of that revolution
can be better appreciated by considering that
a) While physics refers to individual and changing material realities, ma-
thematics is based on abstract and invariable principles. The foundation of
present-day mathematics are axioms. “The role of intuition and observation
is explicitly limited to motivation and is heuristic. Once the axioms have
been formulated, intuition and observation are banished. They are not part of
mathematics.”6
b) Physicists have only a practical knowledge of how mathematics and
reality are connected, namely by performing experiments. Thus, the link
between the two bodies of knowledge – mathematics and experience – is
located within the cognitive and practical capacities of the experimenter-theo-
retician. Yet, it is unknown, whether there is such a link in reality itself. The
answer to that question would be based on experience and purely theoretical.
5 EDUARD J. DIJKSTERHUIS, The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1961), passim.
6 STEWARD SHAPIRO, Thinking about Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 151.
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In our context, we need only to take into account that the lack of know-
ledge about the relationship between things mathematical and things material
has brought about the hypothetical-deductive method of physics. That method
has generated in Physics, over the centuries, a typical epistemological cli-
mate, which is pinpointed by the conviction of physicists that nature is, by
and large, unintelligible. Therefore, it is necessary, to make models and hy-
potheses, test them by experiments and, if convenient, improve the models
and hypotheses by a process of trial and error. If the relationship between
things mathematical and things material were known, it would be possible to
write down mathematical laws of nature after just having thought about them.
The conviction that nature is unintelligible (at least for scientific purposes)
forces the physicist to produce pictures of nature by himself. The following
three quotations paradigmatically tell about how physicists themselves de-
scribe what they are doing and think of what they do. The first quotation
stems from Heinrich Hertz. Though written more than 100 years ago, these
words continue being a guideline of a physicist’s professional work:
“The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our
conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation
of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in accordance
with such anticipation. […] In endeavouring thus to draw inferences as to the
future from the past, we always adopt the following process. We form for
ourselves images [innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of external objects; and
the form which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the
images in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in
nature of the things pictured.
[…] The images which we here speak of are our conceptions of things.
With the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect,
namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned, requirement. For our purpose it
is not necessary that they should be in conformity with the things in any
other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we
any means of knowing, whether our conceptions of things are in conformity
with them in any other than this one fundamental respect. […] The images
which we may form of things are not determined without ambiguity by the
requirement that the consequents of the images must be the images of the
consequents.”7
7 HEINRICH HERTZ, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form (London:
McMillan, 1899), Introduction.
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The second quotation is by Stephen Hawking/Leonid Mlodinow and sums
up in a few concise words the ideas of Hertz and, at the same time, pinpoints
the mindset of the vast majority of present day physicists:
“There is no picture- or theory-independent concept of reality. Instead we
adopt a view that we call model-dependent realism: the idea that a physical
theory or world picture is a model (generally of a mathematical nature) and
a set of rules that connect the elements of the model to observations.”
“According to the idea of model-dependent realism […] our brains inter-
pret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the outside
world. We form mental concepts of our home, trees, other people, the electri-
city that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and other universes.
These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-
independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates
a reality of its own.”
“Your reality depends on the model you employ.”8
Another sample of the same mindset is Karl Popper’s well-known idea of
theory laden experience:
“Even the careful and sober testing of our ideas by experience is in its turn
inspired by ideas: experiment is planned action in which every step is guided by
theory. We do not stumble upon our experiences, nor do we let them flow over
us like a stream. Rather, we have to be active: we have to ‘make’ our experien-
ces. It is we who always formulate the questions to be put to nature; it is we
who try again and again to put these questions so as to elicit a clear-cut ‘yes’
or ‘no’ (for nature does not give an answer unless pressed for it). And in the
end, it is again we who give the answer, it is we ourselves who, after severe
scrutiny, decide upon the answer to the question we put to nature.”9
In conclusion, we might qualify the epistemological setting of Physics as
broadly Kantian, as can be seen from the following key quotations from the
Critique of pure reason:
“Although all our knowledge begins with experience, that doesn't mean
that it all comes from experience.”10 For “[t]he order and regularity in ap-
pearances, which we call Nature, are put there by ourselves. We could never
8 STEPHEN HAWKING, LEONID MLODINOW, The Grand Design – A New Explanation of the
Universe (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), p. 42, 172 and 175, respectively.
9 KARL R. POPPER, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Routledge Classic, 2002),
n. 85.
10 IMMANUEL KANT, Critique of pure Reason (2. edition, 1787), www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, margin number 1.
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find them in appearances if it weren’t that we, or the nature of our mind, had
first put them there.”11
And a little bit later, another reference to the “copernican turn”:
“Even though it might seem counterintuitive, the understanding isn’t a mere
power of formulating rules through comparison of appearances; it is itself the
lawgiver of Nature. It’s only through the understanding that Nature exists at all!
[…]. Nature is the synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to
rules. And appearances can’t exist outside us−they exist only in our sensibility.
Thus, Nature […] is possible only in the unity of self-awareness.”
The intellectual dependence from Kant is obvious, even though only a mi-
nority of physicists might be aware of that philosophical affiliation.
As is well known, the method of making theoretical hypotheses and testing
them experimentally is highly successful. This word ‘successful’ indicates
that a new category comes into play, which is not identical to ‘truth’. Rou-
ghly speaking, it goes like this: based on his experiments, the experimenter
states a harmony or lack of harmony (not: equality or lack of it) between real
physical processes and their mathematical representation. The harmony is
measured quantitatively and is, according to all experience, gradual (between
0 and 100%, excluding the limits). If the harmony surpasses a threshold
determined by convention, one speaks of ‘success’. That is not reducible to
the pair of concepts true – false.
‘Nevertheless, the category success is not completely alien to the catego-
ries of true and false, for the success is a true success. (Otherwise, there
would be no technology at all, but chaos.) Therefore, the success contributes
to the moral goodness of a physicist’s professional actions. But again, success
– or in Hertz’s terminology, the possibility of predicting physical processes
− is not identical with truth. The considerable loss of truth has led, alto-
gether, to a deep skepticism that is hiding behind the sharp and brilliant
rationality of mathematics. Since centuries, there exists an increasing tension
between the investigation of nature such as it is (truth) and the interest in
practical applications of that investigation (success). The claim that this gap
has become one of the most characteristic features of the Western technolo-
gical civilization, does not seem to be an exaggeration.
The problematic character of this situation becomes even clearer by con-
sidering that it is rather the knowledge of truth and not only the ability of
11 IMMANUEL KANT, Critique of pure Reason (first edition, 1781), www.earlymoderntexts.
com/assets/pdfs/kant1781part1.pdf, marginal number A125. The following quotation is from
marginal number A127.
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practicing some successful procedures which leads, in the long run, to a bet-
ter technology. In other words, one could distinguish between a physics made
according to the mindset of engineers (using models, simplifications, with the
aim of achieving a working theory with technical applications) and a physics
made according to the mindset of philosophers, who are less interested in
technology, than in the truth. Thus, on the long run, it pays off to take into
account a philosophy-minded physics.
Given the present-day diversity of philosophical schools, a first distinction
is helpful as to which sort of philosophy would do it best. On the one hand,
in physics, such as it has historically developed, the two bodies of knowledge
– experiential and mathematical – are united in the experimenter-theoretician
only. On the other hand, it is unknown whether the corresponding realities
– individual material things and abstract mathematical objects – are united
in these very same material things. The answer to the question for the best
suited philosophy proceeds by using a classical distinction: an Aristotelian-
type philosophy would see both elements united in the material things (uni-
versale in re), a Kantian-type philosophy would tend to deny precisely that
(universale post rem), as well as a Platonist-type philosophy (universale ante
rem). Thence, the Aristotelian-type philosophy is the only candidate for pos-
sibly giving an account of the union of both in reality itself.
V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AMENDMENT:
INTELLIGIBILITY
The opposition of epistemological climates is certainly a shortcoming, as
a personal as well as a common “public” intellectual situation. Therefore, it is
reasonable trying to dissolve it. It seems that such a dissolution requires getting
rid of certain reductionisms, which are connected with experiments and do not
correspond to anything in nature. Obviously, here becomes relevant the experi-
menter’s creativity. Among these reductionisms are the choice of an experimental
object and an experimental apparatus and the prevalent attribution of the experi-
mental result to the object alone. It is clear from the very outset that such a dis-
solution requires comprehensive considerations of many sorts and can hardly be
realized neither by a single person nor in a short time.
In any case, the amendment of the morality of a physicist’s professional
actions depends on the degree to which the opposition between the epistemo-
logical climate of Physics and the one of Natural Realism can be dissolved. For
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that end, it could be helpful to have a closer look at the present epistemological
situation of physics which can be characterised by the following four contrasts:
Physics has always been a science based on experience. Experiments, too, are
embedded in experience. On the other hand, the philosophical mainstream ever
since Descartes claims that experience is not a sufficient source of knowledge
or not a source of knowledge at all.
Experiments are used as a means to obtain information about an object.
But at the same time, experiments are viewed as a perturbation of that
object. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain knowledge about
the unperturbed object.
In physics, things mathematical are connected with things material. Howe-
ver, at the same time, the dominating axiomatic construction of mathematics
suggests that it has little or nothing to do with the material world.
It is unknown why and how certain mathematical objects relate to material
things. Nevertheless, physics has found itself for centuries in an ever increa-
sing mathematization. This process makes physics flee into a surrogate ratio-
nality and alienate itself more and more from natural realism.
After that, it might be easier to examine the problem itself, i.e. the ques-
tion ‘why exists mathematics in physics’. In fact, every year appears a con-
siderable amount of publications on precisely that topic, although very few
in the spirit of Natural Realism. Thus, so far is little hope for an amendment
of the morality of a physicist’s professional actions.
The solution of the problem ‘why exists mathematics in physics?’ should
neither use mathematics nor simply dismiss physics as a whole such as it has
historically developed. The former is necessary for the sake of logical vali-
dity of the solution, and the latter takes into account that the success of phy-
sics is true and not fictitious, even though success is different from truth.
This situation of as well – as seems to be the main difficulty of the problem.
The question of “why exists mathematics in physics” is not identical with
the actual derivation of mathematical theories of physical processes from
experience. But it is to be expected that the answer to the question ‘why’
also provides information about that derivation. Conversely, such derivation
would largely, if not completely, answer the question ‘why’. However, it is
clear from the outset that a derivation cannot yield the already known suc-
cessful physical-mathematical theories. For then the reductionisms would
have to be deduced despite the fact that they have been excluded from the
outset. That is impossible.
Such a derivation, assuming its existence, would provide a “more compre-
hensive” mathematical theory. Given such a theory, it should be expected that
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the hitherto known successful physical-mathematical theories would somehow
appear as a “projection” or as a “special case”, with the abovementioned reduc-
tionisms having to be reintroduced. It is obvious that such a derivation would
prove a high degree of intelligibility of nature. This would at least greatly reduce
the opposition of epistemological climates, which would have corresponding
consequences for the morality of a physicist’s professional actions.
But it is certainly wiser to refrain from further speculation and to focus on
what lies within reach. The systematic avoidance of abstractions, models and
simplifications from the very outset and the working out of the consequences is,
in fact, something that can be tackled immediately. It possibly provides a kind
of control of the losses due to the reductionisms in present-day physics. Whate-
ver the details of that approach, it should be based, from the outset, on a high
cognitive value of experience and thus on Natural Realism.12
Even such a control would be a certain proof of the intelligibility of na-
ture and would reduce the said opposition of epistemological climates. It
would confirm that present-day physics is truly successful, on the one hand
but, on the other hand, the success is driven away from truth by the reductio-
nisms. This limiting qualification of success radically changes the epistemolo-
gical situation of a physicist. He now knows that the current epistemological
climate of physics is not “the last word,” and that abstractions, models, and
simplifications may be useful and successful, but always come at the price
of loss of knowledge.
VI. THE CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE
OF THE AMENDMENT: 1 Cor 10:31
The outcome of the philosophical perspective makes it clear for theolo-
gians as well as for non-believers that only a Physics which is equipped that
control can be an adequate partner for the dialogue with Theology. This
makes us turn th the Christian perspective of amendment. There is no need
to stress once again that the only specific contribution of Christianity for
solving the problem is precisely that Christian revelation powerfully backs up
12 An example of how to settle the approach and what sort of results can be expected is
offered in: RUDOLF LARENZ, What Can Thomistic Philosophy of Nature Contribute to Physics?,
Societal Studies 2013, 5(2): 481-499, and IDEM, Substance and Dynamics: Two Elements of
Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Nature in the Foundation of Mathematics in Physics,
Studia Gilsoniana 2017, 6(3): 451-483.
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the conviction of the world’s intelligibility. This certainly encourages a Chri-
stian to face the problem and, if it is within his reach, to try to tackle it with
the intellectual means available to everybody, whether baptized or unbaptized.
It will help a Christian to continue his investigation even in moments when
no progress is in sight.
The reserve of Christianity with respect to particularities of the solution
is the reason why the pertinent indications of the Magisterium are very gene-
ral and, at the same time, very fundamental. An example for this is the ap-
peal, that John Paul II addresses to scientists in his encyclical Fides et ratio:
“Finally, I cannot fail to address a word to scientists, whose research
offers an ever greater knowledge of the universe as a whole and of the in-
credibly rich array of its component parts, animate and inanimate, with their
complex atomic and molecular structures. So far has science come, especially
in this century, that its achievements never cease to amaze us. In expressing
my admiration and in offering encouragement to these brave pioneers of
scientific research […]. I would urge them to continue their efforts without
ever abandoning the sapiential horizon within which scientific and technolo-
gical achievements are wedded to the philosophical and ethical values which
are the distinctive and indelible mark of the human person.”13
The only word in this passage marked as a key word is ‘sapiential’. Natu-
ral sciences, as well as human knowledge in general, should strive to assimi-
late the sapiential horizon given by reality itself rather than pretend to consti-
tute themselves as a sapiential horizon. This is true irrespective of whether
the human persons implied are believers or not. Obviously, this is nothing
but a sign of the prioritarian position of Natural Realism.
Christians possess the explicit certainty that all reality is not only the
immediate root of the sapiential horizon, but that the horizon is created by
God. Thus, a Christian knows that everything without exception bears a rela-
tionship to the Creator. Therefore, (the continuously itself potentiating) tech-
nology is not a surrogate for God, but a gift of God, as is given to under-
stand by a text from Gaudium et spes:
“Today, especially with the help of science and technology, [man] has
extended his mastery over nearly the whole of nature and continues to do so.
Hence many benefits once looked for, especially from heavenly powers, man
has now enterprisingly procured for himself.” (GS 33) “[…] This human
activity accords with God’s will. For man, created to God’s image, received
13 IOANNES PAULUS II, Encyclical Fides et ratio, 106,2.
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a mandate to subject to himself the earth and all it contains, and to govern
the world with justice and holiness; a mandate to relate himself and the tota-
lity of things to Him Who was to be acknowledged as the Lord and Creator
of all. Thus, by the subjection of all things to man, the name of God would
be wonderful in all the earth. […] Thus, far from thinking that works pro-
duced by man’s own talent and energy are in opposition to God’s power, and
that the rational creature exists as a kind of rival to the Creator, Christians
are convinced that the triumphs of the human race are a sign of God’s grace
and the flowering of His own mysterious design” (GS 34).14
The admonition of St. Paul: “Whether you eat or drink or do anything
else, do everything to glorify God!” (1 Cor 10:31) expresses the same idea,
without referring to any special human achievements. His words refer to both
the intention of the actor and to what he actually does. In addition, they
implicitly include a harmony between intention and action, or rather an invi-
tation to reconcile or hold action in keeping with the intention. This harmony
between thinking and willing, on the one hand, and acting, on the other, does
not come about automatically, as the general experience teaches and Jesus
gives to understand (Matth. 23:2).
1 Cor 10:31 together with the just mentioned explanations makes it clear
that the invitation of Fides et ratio to internalize a sapiential horizon also
belongs to the glory of God. In the case of the professional work of physi-
cists, they stand before the task to integrate the epistemological climate of
Physics into a sapiential horizon. This in turn means to make the epistemolo-
gical climate of Natural Realism part of the bases of Physics. Only then the
internal practical-theoretical contradiction disappears, that a physicist is
forced by his science to understand his professional actions as if they were
guided by the view of nature as unintelligible, while he is, in the light of his
Natural Realism convinced that nature is intelligible. This conviction is con-
firmed by Christian revelation.
VII. CONCLUSION
The contrast between the epistemological climate prevailing in physics and
that of Natural Realism makes a physicist deny practically, day in and day
out, by his professional action, of which he is convinced theoretically. It is
14 SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et spes, 33, 34.
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a sign that the Kantian “copernican turn” is not able to leave Natural Rea-
lism. This denial allows for different degrees, depending on how his world
view is shaped by natural realism or additionally by the Christian faith. Mo-
reover, the depth of denial depends on the proximity of a physicist’s profes-
sional work to ultimate questions. This opposition diminishes the moral good-
ness of a physicist’s actions, but never transforms the morally good profes-
sional actions of a physicist into something morally evil. Therefore, it is
possible to fulfill the request in 1 Cor 10:31, but not fully. It should be
repeated that the emphasis on the opposition of epistemological climates and
the subsequent discourse is almost completely absent in the academic dispute.
The situation just described began with the Scientific Revolution of the
17th century and has deepened ever since. Over the centuries, the success of
natural sciences has led to a scientific-technological civilization accompanied
by a specific intellectual climate. It also means that the practical implications
of knowledge become more important than philosophy and religion. Accor-
dingly, the power of philosophy and religion to inspire action and life, is
valued less.
In contrast, the findings resumed in the first paragraph of this section
suggest that the philosophical problem of the opposition of epistemological
climates should be recognized as such and its solution tackled. Christianity
underpins the conviction of the intelligibility of nature, thus encouraging
a fundamental problem of physics (things mathematical – things material) to
be tackled with the conceptual tools of Natural Realism. To the extent that
this encouragement is put into practice, we are undoubtedly standing before
a powerful element of inculturation of Christianity into the existing scientific-
-technological civilization. That is, the word ’inculturation’ is understood here
primarily in the direction ’from Christianity to culture’ and not vice versa,
as in some historical cases. In this sense, it is not a part, but a flanking aid
of the new Evangelization.
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O ZMIANIE MORALNOS´CI PROFESJONALNYCH DZIAŁAN´ FIZYKA
NOWY ELEMENT INKULTURACJI CHRZES´CIJAN´STWA
W CYWILIZACJE˛ NAUKOWO-TECHNOLOGICZNA˛
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Fizycy sa˛ zobowia˛zani, zgodnie z ustalonymi metodami i standardami fizyki, do mys´lenia
i działania w ramach epistemologicznych, na co głe˛boki wpływ miał I. Kant. Klimat epistemo-
logiczny, w którym sie˛ znajduja˛, sprzeciwia sie˛ epistemologicznemu klimatowi realizmu natu-
ralnego, a tym samym epistemologicznemu klimatowi Objawienia chrzes´cijan´skiego, kiedy
mówi ono o naszym s´wiecie. Ten kontrast niszczy wewne˛trzna˛ harmonie˛ s´wiata umysłowego
kaz˙dego fizyka w takim stopniu, w jakim zalez˙y on od jego ogólnego sposobu mys´lenia,
a takz˙e od jego pracy zawodowej. Sytuacja ta trwa od czasów rewolucji naukowej XVII wieku,
tak z˙e wczes´niejsza cywilizacja odznaczaja˛ca sie˛ realizmem i duchem chrzes´cijan´skim została
w zasadzie zasta˛piona przez cywilizacje˛ naukowo-technologiczna˛.
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Historyczny rozwój fizyki doprowadził do sytuacji, w której praca zawodowa fizyków, z jej
niewa˛tpliwymi sukcesami i wkładem w poste˛p, prowadzi wraz z moralnie godziwym przedmiotem
do dwóch złych skutków. Pierwszym złym skutkiem jest współistnienie w umys´le fizyka dwóch
przeciwnych epistemologicznych klimatów, co niszczy wewne˛trzna˛ harmonie˛ jego s´wiata umysło-
wego. Natychmiast pocia˛ga to za soba˛ drugi zły skutek w sytuacji, gdy fizyk, aby byc´ zawodowo
konkurencyjnym, jest zmuszony do przestrzegania metod i standardów fizyki, tak jak teraz. W ten
sposób przyczynia sie˛ do braku harmonii w jego umysłowym s´wiecie i poprzez swój drobny wkład
utrwala ducha tych metod i standardów. W trudniejszej sytuacji jest fizyk, który jest chrzes´cijani-
nem i chce wykonywac´ swoja˛ prace˛ zawodowa˛ na chwałe˛ Boga (por. 1 Kor 10,31). W obu przy-
padkach fizyk, wykonuja˛c swoja˛ prace˛ zawodowa˛, w praktyce zaprzecza o tym, o czym jest w teo-
rii przekonany, a mianowicie o realizmie naturalnym, a dodatkowo, w przypadku chrzes´cijanina
takz˙e o tym, z˙e chrzes´cijan´skie Objawienie mówi o naszym s´wiecie w duchu naturalnego realizmu.
Wszystko to nie jest nieznane, ale mimo to jest praktycznie pomijane w dyskursie akade-
mickim. W zwia˛zku z tym, celem tego artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na powyz˙sza˛ kwestie˛,
a naste˛pnie wskazanie kilku sposobów dokładniejszego zbadania kontrastu epistemologicznych
klimatów, poniewaz˙ fizyka jest cze˛s´ciowo kształtowana przez eksperymenty, a jej historyczny
rozwój jest równiez˙ cze˛s´ciowo warunkowy. Dlatego moz˙liwe jest osia˛gnie˛cie lepszej harmonii
epistemologicznych klimatów fizyki i realizmu naturalnego. Artykuł sugeruje takz˙e pewne idee
w tym zakresie. Jes´li okaz˙a˛ sie˛ one owocne, przyczynia˛ sie˛ do inkulturacji chrzes´cijan´stwa
w naszej cywilizacji naukowo-technicznej. Innymi słowy stanowiłoby to wsparcie dla nowej
ewangelizacji.
Słowa kluczowe: inkulturacja chrzes´cijan´stwa; moralnos´c´ czynów o podwójnym skutku; fizyka;
cywilizacja naukowo-technologiczna; realizm naturalny; objawienie chrzes´cijan´skie; klimaty
epistemologiczne.
